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Abstract
Distributed computing has enabled developers and researchers to solve complex problems at
an impressive scale. Users implicitly trust these subtasks to be performed accurately and this
trust can be abused by malicious service providers who aim to compromise the integrity of the
system. These problems can be solved by using dedicated hardware; however it is expensive
or impossible to distribute this solution to all providers in a system. In this paper, we explore
InTest, a service integrity attestation framework that uses replay-based consistency checks
to detect malicious service providers without the use of dedicated hardware. We investigate
if its performance is affected by network topology, its accuracy in the face of incomplete
information, and if it can be improved by minimally utilizing dedicated hardware. Our
preliminary solution, Cloud Anchor, reduces the number of duplicated tasks by 30% while
providing identical detection rates as the prior solution.

v

Table of Contents
1 Introduction

1

2 Background

3

2.1

Distributed Systems and Cloud Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.2

Roots of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2.2.1

Trusted Platform Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2.2.2

SGX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2.3

Byzantine Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2.4

Graph Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

2.5

Remote Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

3 The IntTest Simulator

8

3.1

Preliminary Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

3.2

IntTest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

3.3

IntTest Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

3.4

Simulator Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

3.4.1

12

Task Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 Exploring the IntTest Framework

14

4.1

Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

4.2

Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

4.2.1

Function Crossover Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

4.2.2

Pipeline Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

vi

4.3

Realistic Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 Cloud Anchor

22
28

5.1

Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

5.2

Cloud Anchor Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

5.3

Preliminary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

6 Conclusions

35

6.1

Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

6.2

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

Bibliography

37

Appendices

40

A

Additional Graphs and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vita

41
45

vii

List of Tables
4.1

Function Densities for a Tall Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

A1

Function Densities for a Wide Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

viii

List of Figures
3.1

Example of a replay-based consistency check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

3.2

Complete consistency graph for function f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

3.3

Attestation Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

4.1

3 service functions, 10 providers each, 20% malicious nodes . . . . . . . . . .

15

4.2

3 service functions, 10 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, partial crossover

17

4.3

3 service functions, 10 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, partial crossover

18

4.4

Example of a Tall and Wide 27 Node Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

4.5

10 service functions, 3 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, no crossover . .

20

4.6

10 service functions, 3 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, crossover . . . .

21

4.7

10 service functions, 3 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, full crossover . .

22

4.8

Geometric Distribution of the wide and tall pipeline configurations . . . . . .

23

4.9

Graphing attestation graph densities for a wide pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

4.10 Three functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, no crossover . .

25

4.11 Ten functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, partial crossover .

26

4.12 Ten functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, full crossover . . .

27

5.1

Example of Cloud Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

5.2

Three functions, 1000 data tuples, no crossover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

5.3

Duplication frequencies of a wide pipeline with partial crossover . . . . . . .

32

5.4

Duplication frequencies of a wide pipeline with partial crossover . . . . . . .

33

5.5

Wide service pipeline, 1000 data tuples, partial crossover, with liars . . . . .

34

ix

A1

Three functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, partial crossover,
with liars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A2

Three functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, full crossover,
with liars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A3

41

42

Ten functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, no crossover, with
liars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

43

Chapter 1
Introduction
Distributed systems can be a wonderful tool for solving widespread and difficult tasks by
allowing a user to effectively scale their workload, storage, and communication to the size of
their problem. This scalability makes it difficult to manage the integrity of this shared service
without proper administrative tools in place. Orchestration and configuration management
can be used to produce a resilient infrastructure but for environments that are sensitive to
interruptions, downtime can be costly. Remote attestation offers a way for administrative
systems to question a service provider and verifiers to submit proof of their integrity.
Existing remote attestation implementations [Shi et al., Eldefrawy et al., Seshadri et al.]
can effectively provide service integrity for their distributed systems, but either require
specialized hardware or kernel support. These requirements may be difficult or impossible
to deploy in a large-scale cloud or grid computing environments.
In this paper, we explore a software-only service integrity framework named IntTest which
uses an integrated graph analysis scheme to pinpoint malicious service providers. First, we
ask if IntTest is an efficient service integrity solution and show that it can accurately pinpoint
malicious providers with only a few edges in its graph-based solution. We then show how
its performance may vary given different service configurations. We demonstrate how it
performs suffers under realistic adversarial models. Finally, we reveal how IntTest can be
enhanced with minimal use of dedicated hardware through our solution: Cloud Anchor.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Chapter 2 will provide relevant background
on cloud computing, remote attestation, and graph theory concepts used in the IntTest
1

solution. Chapter 3 will present the fundamental prior work to the IntTest solution, the
methodology behind the framework, and the intuition behind our simulation. In Chapter 4
we will explore the solution through our simulation and demonstrate its performance under a
variety of scenarios. Lastly, Chapter 5 reveals our improvement to the system Cloud Anchor
and preliminary results on its efficiency and effectiveness in the aforementioned environments.
Finally, Chapter 6 will present future work and our conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Distributed Systems and Cloud Environments

Distributed systems are modern computing architectures that have changed the way we
consume and process information. While simply defined as a system of computers attached
via a network, their utility can be expressed in a variety of Software-Oriented Architectures.
Service-Oriented Architectures are a novel design that offers attributes of the distributed
environment to the end user. Infrastructure-as-a-Service allows users to use the physical
infrastructure of the distributed system as if it were bare metal to control networking,
memory, and core cpu usage.

This is accomplished via abstractions such as virtual

machines and cloud computing software. Platform-as-a-Service offers a base-of-operations
for developers to run and execute custom software on their machines. These programs do not
interact with the bare metal directly but are commonly used as development environments or
deployment platforms. Software-as-a-Service offers the user an application that is deployed
across the distributed network for scalability and availability.[Alonso et al.]
The proliferation of Service Oriented Architectures has lead to an increase in distributed
security concerns as each platform exposes portions of the network to malicious applications
and users who aim to break through those abstractions.

3

2.2

Roots of Trust

Trust anchors are a security primitive in which the item’s security is assumed and not
derived. In certificate chains, X509 root certificates provide the starting link in a chain
of trust. In distributed systems, they offer a guaranteed starting point for many trusted
computing environments or a location for a centralized trusted device. Hardware roots of
trust are essential in developing a robust, secure computing environment.

2.2.1

Trusted Platform Module

A Trusted Platform Module is an international standard for a secure coprocessor that
performs various tasks related to cryptographic keys to secure the host machine. The main
specification was designed by the Trusted Computing Group and provides a suite of hardware
components to enable a variety of features.
It is capable of providing a secure pseudorandom number generator for cryptographic
primitives and key generation and management.

These features enable it to perform

attestation for protected services and trusted boot.[Morris]

2.2.2

SGX

Intel Software Guard Extensions are a set of extensions to the Intel architecture that can
guarantee confidentiality and integrity for application in spite of the operating system or any
higher privileged application on the device.[Costan and Devadas]

2.3

Byzantine Fault Tolerance

For a shared or distributed computing environment, a Byzantine fault is any fault or
disagreement when a result is presented to different observers. These can lead to in Byzantine
failures which is when a system loses service due to a Byzantine fault in any system that
require consensus.[Driscoll et al.]
The name itself comes from a colorful description of Byzantine generals at war who must
come to a consensus on when to sack an enemy city. The generals and their lieutenants
4

are mounted on different sides of the city and must communicate with messengers. The
challenge is to come to this consensus and guarantee the messages have not been modified or
misreported by a traitors messenger, lieutenant, or general. In spite of the anthropomorphic
representation of the problem, it appears frequently in distributed systems that must have
consistent information.[Lamport et al.]
If the functioning components of a Byzantine fault tolerant system are operating correctly,
they will continue to provide the system’s service with improved resiliency.

2.4

Graph Theory

The implementations extended in this paper depend on certain fundamental concepts in the
domain of graph theory: cliques and minimum vertex covers.
Cliques are a subset of vertices of an undirected graph such that every two distinct
vertices in the clique are connected by and edge or adjacent. Another way to view this
concept is that the subgraph formed by the edges and vertices of the clique is complete. A
maximal clique is a clique can not be increased by adding a single adjacent vertex in the
graph, meaning it is the largest complete subgraph of a graph. Finding the maximal clique
of a graph can be accomplished efficiently via the Bron-Kerbosh algorithm.
Bron-Kerbosh is an efficient algorithm discovered by Dutch computer scientists Coenraad
Bron and Joep Kerbosch in 1973. It’s a recursive backtracking algorithm that, given 3 sets,
will discover all maximal cliques of a graph in the set.[Bron and Kerbosch]
Another important concept of graph theory to understand for this paper are vertex covers
and specifically the minimum vertex cover of a graph. A vertex cover is defined as a subset
of vertices in a graph such that all edges of the subset are incident to at least one vertex in
the larger graph. More simply, it’s a set S of vertices of G such that every edge of G has
at least one of member of S as an endpoint. A minimal vertex cover is the smallest set of
vertices whose edges cover the entire graph. While the concept seems simple, finding the
minimum vertex cover of a graph is a classically NP-Complete problem. The approaches
used in the paper can approximate the minimum vertex cover in a timely manner due to the
size of the graphs produced.[Karakostas]
5

2.5

Remote Attestation

Remote Attestation is a concept that allows a computer’s integrity to be evaluated by a
remote party. This is commonly performed to check for unknown malware present in the
memory (persistent or volatile) of a system. Its utility can be extended to detect insufficient
configurations, objectionable system properties, or benign software that may not comply
with the party’s license agreements.[Lpez and Zhou]
The concept of remote attestation the relationship between two machines: an attestor and
a verifier. Similar to its legal definition, the attestor is one who attests to the integrity of the
system by providing their signature or checksum. The verifier is the individual or system that
is initializing the challenge and verifying the received checksum. Common implementations
require computing a checksum or token that will either produce an incorrect result or cause
a measurable delay if modified.[Francillon et al.]
Sharing a symmetric key, the verifier submits a challenge to the attestor with a nonce
and expects the result in a limited amount of time to constrain any efforts from malicious
attacker to forge a legitimate response. The attestor must prove they have a legitimate
section of software loaded into memory. They combine the requested value with the nonce,
sign the response, and return it to the verifier. The verifier checks the signature and the
response from the attestor.[Shi et al., Eldefrawy et al., Seshadri et al.]
Remote attestation frameworks can be used in a variety of environments but are simply
demonstrated in a distributed network. Distributed networks can be meticulously managed
to ensure each node is performing as intended with an unmodified firmware with untampered
input however this does not scale with the growth of these networks. To ease the overhead
required to manage distributed nodes, hardware trust anchors can used to manage keys,
attest sections of memory. Most remote attestation frameworks that use trust anchors assume
they are applied on all critical nodes of a network and concern themselves with efficient
management of the attestation metadata. While hardware anchors can successfully check
the integrity of nodes in a distributed network, there are many cases in which a hardware
anchor is unavailable for a node, or the critical service is provided by a third party. In these

6

cases, software-only approaches are novel ways to accomplish network integrity without
additional hardware.[Lpez and Zhou]
Software-only remote attestation schemes have been developed to attest memory regions,
process integrity, and even controlled execution. SCUBA[Eldefrawy et al.], a software-only
approach based on it’s predecessor Pioneer[Seshadri et al.], is able to attest to memory
regions of the remote system by ensuring the checksum is calculated atomically. Another
method, BIND[Shi et al.] is able to attest to the memory region of an application nd its
output to verify not only the applications integrity but it’s output. These functions can
be extended to run processes in a controlled manner by passing the controlled execution
environment to the critical application. The benefit of these approaches are the exclusion of
dedicated hardware but recent improvements to hardware trust anchors can guarantee these
properties more efficiently and effectively.
Most implementations required trusted hardware to be ubiquitous throughout the
environment Others required a third-party to confirm memory regions or signatures. Initial
implementations of this are can be improved with a costly oracle, but not a hybrid solution.

7

Chapter 3
The IntTest Simulator
3.1

Preliminary Work

As mentioned in the prior section, cloud computing is an effective means of solving complex
problems with distributed, parallel solutions. In particular, data-stream processing services
appear to be an effective use of the scalability and distribution cloud computing offers; but
when many tasks are distributed to disparate service providers, the ability to fully control
those services becomes increasingly difficult. To combat this problem, RunTest and its
similar frameworks were devised to guarantee the service remained intact as its modular
components were distributed to other service providers.
RunTest[10] is a lightweight attestation scheme that determines dataflow integrity
by graphing and analyzing consistency relationships between service providers without
additional hardware. RunTest expected If two service providers are functionally equivalent
and produce different results from the same input, one can be considered malicious. These
replay-based consistency checks are used to effect the edges of a consistency graph for each
function in processing pipeline.
Consider the following graph in Figure 3.1. For the given data processing pipeline, there
are three service functions f, g, h that are processing data in stages by providers 1 − 9. As
data flows through the pipeline, the RunTest framework will record a percentage of the full
data-paths at random. It then sends the same input values along a different service path. If
two service providers were given the same inputs and the same outputs were produced, the
8

Figure 3.1: Example of a replay-based consistency check
service integrity is preserved and these providers are considered bengin. If the values differ,
it can be assumed that one of the given outputs is invalid and its creator is malicious.

Figure 3.2: Complete consistency graph for function f
RunTest builds a weighted graph by comparing the intermediate and final results of each
functionally equivalent service provider with each other. This can pinpoint which provider in
the processing pipeline is modifying the result. The inital approach incurrs a high overhead
since the duplications require a full run through the processing pipeline to produce redundant
results. The authors of their respective papers developed IntTest to alleviate the attestation
overhead and reduce false positives.

3.2

IntTest

IntTest[8] is an attestation scheme that builds upon its predecessor RunTest[10] by
abandoning weighted graphs in favor of simple per-function consistency graphs and a global

9

inconsistency graph. Relationships between service providers are still determined using
replay-based consistency checks which process verified input values across different service
providers and compare their results. Instead of subtracting values from a weighted edge, an
edge is placed in the function’s consistency graph if they agree. Alternatively, an edge is
placed in global inconsistency graph if these values disagree.

(a) Consistency Graphs

(b) Inconsistency Graph

Figure 3.3: Attestation Graphs
After all input has been processed and our graphs have been formed, IntTest iterates
through each graph to pinpoint malicious service providers. Following the pseudocode in
Figure 1
The algorithm is divided into two halves that first analyze the global inconsistency graph
followed by each consistency graph. The inconsistency graph is connecting edges between
two disjoint sets of consistent and inconsistent nodes. This bipartite graph has a minimum
vertex cover containing the most inconsistent service providers. The pinpoint algorithm uses
this as a lower estimate for the number of malicious service providers we assume to be in
the system. Our upper-bound is constrained to bn/2c. The algorithm iterates over each
provider in the graph and calculates the sum of its neighborhood and remaining edges in the
node’s residual graph. If the sum is above our estimate K, the provider will be pinpointed
as a suspicious node and added to the set Ω.

10

Algorithm 1 Pinpiont Malicious SPs (G,Gi )
2:
4:
6:
8:
10:
12:
14:
16:
18:
20:
22:

function PinpointMaliciousSPs(G,Gi )
for every K ∈ [|CG |, bN/2c] do
Ω = ∅, R = ∅
for every node p in G do
compute |Np | + |CG0p | > K
if |Np | + |CG0p | > K then
Ω = Ω ∪ {p}
end if
end for
final malicious node set R = R ∪ Ω
if R = ∅ then
continue
else
for every Gi do
compute Mi
set Ωi to the subset of Ω appearing in Gi
if Ωi ∩ Mi 6= ∅ then
R = R ∪ Mi
end if
end for
end if
end for
end function
The second half iterates through each consistency graph searching for the maximal clique,

which represents the largest group of consistent nodes for that function. If any values are
missing from that group, they are added to the malicious set Mi for further analysis.
In the final stage we search for providers present in both Mi and Ω and add their groups
to the final set of malicious nodes R.

3.3

IntTest Simulator

The simulator has been developed in Python to fully replicate an implementation of the
IntTest[8] attestation framework. Unlike its predecessor RunTest[10], IntTest investigates
service integrity with two separate graphs that represent consistency and inconsistency
relationships between service providers. These results are collected and processed in turn to
produce a list of potentially malicious nodes.
11

The original was developed to operate in the NCSU virtual computing laboratory[vcl]
which is similar to Amazon’s Elastic Cloud service[ama]. The original authors deployed an
instance of IBM System S[str], a high-performance stream processor, and manage the input
and output values for all participating service providers. The simulator abstracts the task
processing dataflow into a simple pipeline to investigate the overload incurred by duplicating
results without the additional overhead of the underlying system.

3.4

Simulator Data Structures

To abstract the nuanced operations of the System S the simulator uses a combination of
simpler data structures known as Tasks, Functions, and Nodes. Tasks are defined as a
series of functions that iterate through the pipeline processing functions f 1, f 2, . . . , f n for
n functional stages. A task does not have to strictly follow an iterative pipeline in the
simulation but we follow the example set in the IntTest implementation.
A Function represents an independent piece of the dataflow pipeline which is simply
implemented to pass along boolean values to the next stage in the pipeline. As with the
source material, our functions must be input-deterministic.
Nodes are simple data objects that can be labeled malicious or benign at the start of the
simulation. If a nodes input and return values remain True, the node is considered benign and
will report an unmodified output state. A malicious node will always return False and fail
our distance measures. A Node may support multiple functions, but we choose to explore the
effectiveness of the attestation scheme may benefit from various levels of functional crossover
in Chapter 4.

3.4.1

Task Processing

When a task is processed it undergoes the process described in Section 3.2 and each full run
of the pipeline is compared to a functionally equivalent duplicate. For IntTest to make a valid
comparison the inputs must be equivalent for two nodes to be fairly compared. This is true
for intermediate results as well. As a task is processed, the input for each service provider
is recorded. Once the task is finished processing, its return values are compared and edges
12

are formed in their respective attestation graphs. This is sufficient for most data processing;
but a benign node may perform the function correctly on tainted input data. Keeping this
in mind, the Node’s output value only report on the individual node’s performance on the
given input data, to more accurately reflect a proper evaluation function for each pipeline
stage.

13

Chapter 4
Exploring the IntTest Framework
IntTest was designed for Service-Oriented architectures that process data through known
functionally equivalent service providers in a series. The framework can compare intermediate values in an efficient manner to devise suspicious service providers and bypass their
influence on the distributed system. In our investigation, we ask if IntTest excessively
duplicates tasks to fill its attestation graphs. We inquire how the performance of the
framework changes in the face of different service configurations and a realistic attack model.
Lastly, we wonder how the existing implementation can be improved if given a costly oracle
to derive the integrity of a provider.

4.1

Efficiency

The IntTest framework operates under the expectation that all pipeline functions will be
thoroughly attested and their function graphs should be as dense as possible. They come
to rhis step by choosing a percentage of input values to be used for random replay-based
consistency checks. To avoid detection they must randomize the input values and their paths
to ensure the attacker is unable to predict when they may be attested and avoid detection.
This implies there are many redundant consistency checks in which a pair of providers has
already been checked. We inquire whether a complete function graph and inconsistency
graph are necessary for a complete evaluation or can the effort of searching for the last few
unattested pipeline paths?
14

We tested this with a pipeline of three functions with ten unique nodes to service each
function. 20% of the total pool of providers are classified as malicious and we perform our
service checks over 1000 unique data inputs to iterate over the duplication percentage. The
malicious nodes were consistent as duplications increased and the results were the average
of ten runs. This will reflect how many consistency checks are required to attain an accurate
classification.

Figure 4.1: 3 service functions, 10 providers each, 20% malicious nodes

Table 4.1: Function Densities for a Tall Pipeline
Duplication Percentage

Function f1

Function f2

Function f3

20%

0.98

0.82

0.89

30%

0.98

0.96

0.93

40%

1.0

1.0

1.0

50%

1.0

1.0

1.0
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Figure 4.1 shows that IntTest reaches near 100% true positive rates within the first few
checks. Following that, false positives are less than 10% within 200 duplications. Table 4.1
shows the function densities are not fully formed at 20% duplications yet we can easily
arrive at an accurate classification of malicious nodes. IntTest dictates that we would have
to perform another 200 duplications until the conditions are satisfied for analysis.

4.2

Performance

We can conclude that there is an unnecessary amount of redundancy needed to form dense
attestation graphs, but is this true for all service pipeline configurations? To explore this
concept we will first evaluate function pipelines with multi-purpose nodes and then pipelines
that change the ratio of providers to service functions.

4.2.1

Function Crossover Scenarios

Service providers do not have to be dedicated to a single service and can support a variety
of functions. This crossover can be extremely helpful in the aforementioned service-integrity
frameworks. Consistency graphs contain attestation information on one function and its
service providers; but a malicious provider can be more easily discovered if they tamper
multiple functions and appear in multiple graphs.

In our evaluation, we divided the

multifunctionality of a service provider into three configurations to accommodate different
distributed system environments: None, Partial, and Full.
No Crossover
This configuration considers that each service provider only support a single function. This
would be describe a dedicated distributed system that may lacks redundancy but each
provider is highly specialized to handle the task. Figure 4.1 reflects this configuration state
and will be our baseline for performance comparisons. We can see from Table 4.1 that it can
form three complete function graphs at 400 duplications and accurately classify benign and
malicious nodes.

16

Partial
Partial crossover considers the jobs are evenly distributed across service providers and every
node supports at least two service functions. This scenario represents a highly-available
distributed system, in which certain functions are widely distributed across dedicated nodes.
These nodes may perform other tasks but are not solely dedicated to serving a single purpose.

Figure 4.2: 3 service functions, 10 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, partial crossover
As Figure 4.2 shows, there is a slight, but improved performance. The intuition is that
these malicious providers should be present in multiple consistency graphs. Since a malicious
node and a benign node will always disagree, fewer consistency checks are required to discern
the presence of a malicious provider.
Full
The Full crossover configuration represents an environment in which all service providers are
capable of handling every function. This is similar to a job pool scenario where there are no
dedicated providers and all tasks are simply distributed to whichever provider is available.
17

Figure 4.3: 3 service functions, 10 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, partial crossover
Interestingly, the evidence shows that IntTest has a difficult time handling this scenario.
It can easily detect malicious nodes but can not discern malicious from benign and begins to
classify the vast majority of nodes as malicious. Function densities show at 1000 duplications
show that f1 has only 88% of the edges in its function graph, f2 has 79% density, and f3 has
only 68% density. Meaning the maximal clique for each function graph is not fully-formed
and performance can ultimately be hindered by multifunctionality.

4.2.2

Pipeline Configuration

In addition to service crossover, the number of service functions supported by a single dataprocessing pipeline may not be small. For our evaluation we consider two types of pipeline
configurations depending on the ratio of service providers to service functions.
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(a) Tall Service Pipeline

(b) Wide Service Pipeline

Figure 4.4: Example of a Tall and Wide 27 Node Pipeline

Tall Service Pipelines
Pipeline configurations in which there are fewer service functions than there are service
providers are considered to be Tall. The testing parameters above displayed a simple pipeline
of three service functions with ten providers for each function. Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, and
Figure 4.3 display the accuracy and performance of the IntTest framework under the three
aforementioned crossover configurations.
Wide Service Pipelines
Wide service pipeline configurations have many service functions but only a small relative
number of service functions to support each function. This can be seen in Figure 4.4a, in
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which input must pass through nine service functions and only three service providers can
support each effort.
To explore Wide pipeline configurations, our pipeline consisted of ten service functions
and three providers for each function.
When every provider for each function is distinct, we notice a considerable performance
impact. Figure 4.5 reveals true positive rate at 34% while false positives remain low. If there
is partial crossover, performance is not as great as its tall counterpart. Figure 4.6 shows
that having multi-function providers makes malicious nodes easier to pinpoint, however false
positives are difficult to remove without additional duplications. If in a job pool scenario
with full crossover, Figure 4.7 shows we are completely unable to discern a malicious node
from a benign one. The function graph density for this graph can be found in Table A1.

Figure 4.5: 10 service functions, 3 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, no crossover
If we take a moment to consider why the wide configuration caused such poor
performance, there is a key difference in the way IntTest analyzes pipelines. The framework
can only make a valid comparison between two providers if the input is identical. For the
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Figure 4.6: 10 service functions, 3 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, crossover
first tall pipeline, one must only select three providers from a specific test pool. For our
wide pipeline, we must select ten providers and our odds are higher of selecting a malicious
node that would effect our given input path. Figure 4.8 shows the geometric distribution of
each service function pipeline with %20 of our providers being malicious. The cumulative
distribution function of this distribution shows that we are much more likely to encounter a
malicious node in our service path if we are given a wide pipeline as opposed to a tall one.
If IntTest is unable to make valid comparisons, it will have a difficult time classifying
malicious providers. Figure 4.9 shows how this effects the per-function consistency graphs
for a wide pipeline. Graphs for the first three functions are able to become complete graphs
fairly quickly as more duplications are added to its analysis. The next three functions come
closer to complete graphs but they require significantly more duplications. Functions f4 ,f5 ,
and f6 struggle at 600 duplications and function graphs for f7 and f8 are appear to not
converge after 1000 duplications.
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Figure 4.7: 10 service functions, 3 providers each, 20% malicious nodes, full crossover
It appears much of IntTest’s performance can be dictated by the pipeline’s configuration
and we are unable to improve its detection capabilities with additional duplications. In
particular, the information available for analysis becomes more sparse as the pipeline adds
more service functions. While a complete graph is not required for correct classification,
it is easier to have false positives if no comparisons are made between benign nodes. This
analysis was performed under the assumption that malicious providers will always report an
incorrect value when attested, however what where to happen if the attack model were more
realistic?

4.3

Realistic Attack Model

The original IntTest attack model only considered the scenario in which the malicious
provider compromise the integrity of the service function every time it is asked. RunTest[10],
its predecessor, used weighted graphs to derive the inconsistency of a provider. This is not
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Figure 4.8: Geometric Distribution of the wide and tall pipeline configurations
the case for this service framework, which will permanently classify a node malicious on its
first offense. While a reasonable scenario, it is not realistic as a malicious provider may lay
in wait and risk detection compromising a particular input value. To analyze this scenario,
we enable the malicious provider to lie and report as a benign node with a probability of
50%.
As our previous section demonstrated, its performance is largely dependent on the
pipeline configuration. We suspect that tall pipelines will be fairly resistant to this level of
tampering. As stated in Section 4.2.2 there many service paths chosen for service integrity
checks and each have a relatively small path of three service functions. There is less likelihood
that a malicious node will be in the path than a wide pipeline. The Figure 4.10 confirms our
suspicions and is able to quickly arrive at the correct number of malicious nodes and benign
nodes at 200 duplications; however the averages are noticeably more volatile with malicious
nodes changing their answers.
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(a) Functions f1 ,f2 ,f3

(b) Functions f4 ,f5 ,f6

(c) Functions f7 ,f8 ,f9

Figure 4.9: Graphing attestation graph densities for a wide pipeline

Performance already suffered under wider pipelines and the same is true when the attack
model has changed. Figure 4.11 shows the performance similar performance but with much
more volatility. There are certain configurations that appear extremely difficult if near
impossible, such as Figure 4.12. It appears that in the face of lying adversaries, IntTest’s
performance can only worsen. In the following section, we explore how a physical trustanchor can improve the performance and efficiency of the IntTest framework.
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Figure 4.10: Three functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, no crossover
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Figure 4.11: Ten functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, partial crossover
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Figure 4.12: Ten functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, full crossover
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Chapter 5
Cloud Anchor
Cloud Anchor builds upon the framework laid out by Juan Du, Wei Wei, Xiaohui Gu, and
others in the RunTest[10], AdaptTest[9], IntTest[8] attestation schemes.
The Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 enumerated many of the advantages of a software-only
service integrity framework as well as its limitations. We investigate the merit of adding
trusted hardware to facilitate the role of an oracle for this solution. Instead of implementing
hardware ubiquitously throughout the distributed network, we can attest to the integrity
of a provider. We show that it fundamentally changes the efficiency of the framework and
enables it to tackle difficult pipeline configurations.

5.1

Intuition

IntTest is a software-only integrity framework, whose primary advantage to remotely attest
nodes one can not modify with physical hardware. In IoT distributed networks the service
providers are small, embedded devices and power consumption is a priority. For many
cloud environments, the service providers may be a third-party who would not permit a new
device into their infrastructure. Many solutions such as Intel SGX2.2.2 and TPMs2.2.1 are
being used by service providers to offer their services trusted enclaves. Alternatively, we may
control one service as a means for comparison and use the aforementioned remote attestation
features to produce our own oracle.
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Armed with a way to confirm the integrity of a provider we can trust their output, we
can use this trust in addition to our consistency and inconsistency relationships to maintain
application integrity and improve efficiency.

5.2

Cloud Anchor Implementation

Cloud Anchor aims to use the trust of an oracle and distribute that trust throughout the
consistency and inconsistency relationships. This is accomplished by selecting an arbitrary
node as our anchor. We will use the oracle to derive the integrity of this node. Once the
node is marked as an anchor, we continue to use the service pipeline identical to the IntTest
framework. We’ll use replay-based consistency checks to duplicate output for comparison to
another path. We enter a special case if these duplications are with an anchor. If a node
is being compared to an anchor and the input and output values are identical, the node
is considered to be anchored and is added to a set of anchored nodes. Since the nodes are
input-deterministic, comparisons to an anchored node can be considered a direct comparison
to the anchor. Duplications with any member of this anchored set to any member outside
the set will resolve connections made to all anchored members.
Consider Figure 5.1. This graph demonstrates the number of duplications required to
achieve a complete consistency graph for function f in Figure 3.1. IntTest would have to
perform at least three duplications to compare the inputs and outputs between providers 1,
4, 7. In the example above, we discover that 1 and 4 are consistent. In another, 4 and 7 are
inconsistent. We know that provider 1 was already demonstrated to be equivalent to provider
4, yet we must run a novel duplication between providers 1 and 7 to fill the consistency
graph. For Cloud Anchor, consistency checks are transitive and results are propagated to
all anchored nodes. It should be noted that replay-based consistency checks are evaluated
per-function, and in our evaluation we select the node with this most multifunctionality to
distribute that trust to as many service functions as possible.
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(a) Before Cloud Anchor

(b) After Cloud Anchor

Figure 5.1: Example of Cloud Anchor

5.3

Preliminary Results

We evaluated Cloud Anchor under the same guidelines as IntTest. In addition, we we limited
our evaluation to have a single anchor which is the provider who supports the most service
functions. Finally, we iterated through all the previous pipeline configurations.
We noticed an immediate performance change for tall pipelines. The number of service
functions they support are only a few but many duplications are required to increase the
density of each service function. Figure 5.2 shows our performance was slightly better but
significant improvement came when analyzing full crossover for a tall pipeline in Figure 5.4.
IntTest was completely unable to resolve false positives in 1000 duplications yet, Cloud
Anchor has correctly classified all malicious within 400 duplications.
The wide piplines appear to have similar performance to IntTest because the benefits of
using trust transitivity are minimal when the number of service providers in the anchored
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Figure 5.2: Three functions, 1000 data tuples, no crossover
function are small, as Figure. This can be improved by with more crossover. In this scenario,
a single anchored provider can effect multiple service functions. Figure 5.4 shows that we
can improve the false positive rate over 1000 duplications by 10%.
There are some limitations with this solution. Like its predecessor, if the majority of
providers are malicious for a pipeline function. If the service function has no root of trust,
the minority will be incorrectly classified as malicious. This problem can be remedied by
guaranteeing an anchor in every service function. In our test environment, we aim to use
the oracle as little as possible and used a single anchor. In addition, Cloud Anchor performs
poorly when malicious nodes lie. Figure 5.5 shows an extremely volatile graph with a nonzero false negative rate. In these cases, we detected that a malicious node lied when being
attested to the anchor and was added to the anchored set. As in the previous case, this can
be corrected with the continued use of an oracle and is a topic for future work.
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(a) IntTest

(b) Cloud Anchor

Figure 5.3: Duplication frequencies of a wide pipeline with partial crossover
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(a) IntTest

(b) Cloud Anchor

Figure 5.4: Duplication frequencies of a wide pipeline with partial crossover
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Figure 5.5: Wide service pipeline, 1000 data tuples, partial crossover, with liars
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1

Future Work

The current implementation of Cloud Anchor has many of the same limitations as its
predecessor.

If the majority of providers for a certain function are malicious, the

implementation will incorrectly classify the minority. Also, if they are infrequently malicious,
they may escape replay-based checks altogether.
Pipeline density is a constant problem for wide service pipelines. Wenever the data itself
is being used as a means for validation, the compromise of that token can lead to a loss
of information further down the pipeline. We suspect evaluating the pipeline in stages and
removing nodes from the pipeline before input is fully processed can be a means to remedy
this particular problem in future iterations.
Lastly, we intend to explore an implementation of the Cloud Anchor framework in a
live, distributed environment. Cloud Anchor uses trust transitivity to quickly add edges
to consistency attestation graphs, but we believe it can be used solve other problems for
services that do not exist entirely within a secure enclave.

6.2

Conclusion

We explored IntTest the software-only service integrity framework, its benefits and its
limitations. We demonstrated its inefficiency and which configurations lead to improved
35

or diminished performance. We showed how it responds to a realistic attack model and
described a potential solution in Cloud Anchor. This solution uses an oracle to establish a
root of trust and propagates that through the same graph analysis scheme used in IntTest.
We showed how it greatly improves the efficiency of the previous framework and how
trust transitivity may be an effective means for handling service-integrity for hybrid trust
environments.
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A

Additional Graphs and Figures

Figure A1: Three functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, partial crossover,
with liars
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Figure A2: Three functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, full crossover, with
liars
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Figure A3: Ten functions, 1000 data tuples, 20% malicious providers, no crossover, with
liars
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Table A1: Function Densities for a Wide Pipeline
Trial Number

f1

f2

f3

f4

f5

f6

f7

f8

f9

f10

1

0.87

0.78

0.6

0.5

0.37

0.26

0.17

0.12

0.08

0.06

2

0.9

0.76

0.63

0.48

0.37

0.29

0.17

0.13

0.11

0.07

3

0.91

0.81

0.65

0.47

0.39

0.25

0.22

0.15

0.11

0.08

4

0.89

0.77

0.67

0.49

0.39

0.3

0.19

0.14

0.09

0.06

5

0.89

0.77

0.64

0.49

0.38

0.31

0.21

0.15

0.11

0.07

6

0.89

0.78

0.67

0.49

0.39

0.29

0.21

0.14

0.1

0.05

7

0.9

0.82

0.65

0.5

0.4

0.27

0.17

0.13

0.08

0.06

8

0.91

0.77

0.65

0.52

0.38

0.31

0.22

0.13

0.09

0.06

9

0.88

0.8

0.63

0.49

0.36

0.25

0.19

0.12

0.09

0.07

10

0.89

0.79

0.64

0.5

0.39

0.26

0.16

0.1

0.06

0.04
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